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ABSTRACT
The disaster in New Orleans due to Hurricane Katrina showcased the city’s many
environmental problems. The industrial history of the city, subsidence of the city causing it to be
below sea-level, and the fact that the city is protected by levees and pumps were critical elements
of the disaster and played a large role in the emergency response. The disaster led to an
enormous emergency response by many entities, but the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has the lead in these actions. In response to the large number of homes being
flooded and unlivable in Orleans Parish, FEMA implemented its temporary housing program.
This program’s goal is to house the largest number of people in the shortest period of time. The
process in response to Hurricane Katrina involved the placement of manufactured housing on
homeowners’ lawns, in commercial trailer parks, and on properties leased by FEMA. The parks
that FEMA built for manufactured housing are like any other federal action and must comply
with the National Environmental Policy Act.
This research seeks to outline FEMA’s process of implementing temporary housing and
to identify the environmental factors and demographic factors that may have influenced the
siting of temporary housing group sites in Orleans Parish after Hurricane Katrina. This research
uses data on temporary housing sites considered for use and sites that were constructed obtained
from FEMA via Freedom of Information Act Request and U.S. Census data to identify which
factors were essential to the successful siting or unsuccessful siting of temporary housing parks.
The results indicate positive correlations with sites being constructed and being in
historic districts and passing the FEMA environmental review. The results also indicate negative
correlations between sites being constructed and having a Pre-Katrina hazardous material issue
as well as sites being of residential land-use. The difference of means analysis between sites built
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and not built also identified differences between the number of proposed units and the size of the
proposed site. The sites not built had larger means of the proposed number units and the size of
the proposed site.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Research Purpose
The Department of Homeland Security- Federal Emergency Management Agency is the
lead in the response to natural disasters in the United States, which includes providing temporary
housing for disaster victims. This research reviews the environment of New Orleans and how it
played a role in Federal Emergency Management Agency’s temporary housing response to
Hurricane Katrina in Orleans Parish during the five months immediately following the disaster
declaration. Specifically, the environmental factors and socioeconomic factors of the temporary
housing sites that were used and considered for use were evaluated in an attempt to determine
which are associated with the successful siting of temporary housing. This research provides
valuable insight into the implementation of FEMA’s temporary housing program and could be
used to help make future implementations more efficient, safe, and environmentally sound.
Certain criteria of the sites, such as the acreage, proposed action (i.e. the number and type
of housing unit to be installed), existing land use, floodplain status, potential for wetlands to be
present, endangered species habitat present, hazardous materials present, historic/archaeology
potential, and the type of NEPA documentation required (environmental assessment or
categorical exclusion) will be evaluated to determine whether a relationship between these
variables and the approval and construction of temporary housing sites exists. Additionally, the
socioeconomic factors of median property value, median income, and percent of minority
population will be evaluated to identify statistical associations between these variables and
environmental approval and construction of candidate sites.
This research seeks to answer the following questions:
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1. What are the main guidelines and steps involved in implementing FEMA’s temporary housing
program?
2. What factors may influence the successful siting of a temporary housing site?
 What type of land-use was utilized most often?
 Did hazardous materials play a role in the siting of any temporary housing locations?
 Did wetlands play a role in the siting of temporary housing?
 Did any demographic factors play a role in the siting of temporary housing?
This is important because:
1. This is the primary response and recovery policy for all large-scale disasters, ranging from
earthquakes to terrorist attacks for the United States.
2. Hurricane Katrina was a massive U.S. natural disaster, and thus, an important opportunity to
learn how well this policy works when put into action. If there are conditions under which siting
is more likely to occur (as this study may indicate), then a better understanding of those
conditions or combinations of conditions will help in the siting of future temporary housing
communities. In addition, these findings may help address lingering implications that
“NIMBYISM,” allegedly expressed by more affluent residents, may have lead to a systemic
exclusion of sites from relatively affluent areas, creating isolated trailer parks in which evacuees
are unable to obtain access to basic social services, such as mass transit, and health care, making
the recovery process more difficult.
The Storm Event
At 06:10 on the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, just south of the community of Buras, as a strong Category 3
storm (on the Saffir-Simpson Scale). At land fall the wind speeds were approximately 127 mph,
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85 mph on the New Orleans Lakefront, and the central pressure was the third lowest pressure on
record for a landfalling storm in the United States at 920 millibars. Hours before landfall
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Buoy 42040, which is located about
50 miles east of the mouth of the Mississippi River, reported a peak significant wave height of 55
feet, which equals the highest ever measured by a National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) buoy
(NOAA, 2005).
Within 2 hours Hurricane Katrina was 40 miles southeast of New Orleans with hurricane-
force winds outward to 125 miles (Figure 1). The New Orleans Lakefront reported sustained
winds of 69 mph and gusts to 86 mph. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) warned of coastal
storm surge flooding of 18 to 22 feet above normal tide level and locally as high as 28 feet. The
NHC also stated, “Some levees in the Greater New Orleans Area could be overtopped” (NOAA,
2005). By 10:00 a.m., the eye of Hurricane Katrina was making its second coastal landfall near
the Louisiana-Mississippi border and was reported by radar to continue to be intense (Figure
1.)(NOAA, 2005).
The wind damage was significant from Hurricane Katrina, but it was the surge that
accompanied the storm that will be the legacy of Hurricane Katrina (NOAA, 2005). Storm surges
across the gulf coast from Louisiana to Alabama were measured at 10-28 feet. The storm surge
caused the level of Lake Ponchartrain and the Mississippi River to rise, straining the levee and
pumping systems that were protecting New Orleans from flooding (Figure 2).
The strain from this storm surge caused significant levee failures in the 17th Street Canal,
Industrial Canal, and London Avenue Canal on August 30th, allowing large volumes of water to
pour into the mostly below sea-level City of New Orleans, flooding 80 percent of it (See
Appendix A). Some parts of the city had floodwater depths of 20 feet (NOAA, 2005). This
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inundation flooded sewerage treatment facilities, chemical storage facilities, a former Superfund
site, and many other industrial facilities that had the potential to leak harmful contaminants into
the floodwater, which enabled the media to label the floodwaters a “toxic soup” (Pardue, 2005).
The city was pumped dry by September 20, but the storm surge from approaching Hurricane Rita
caused another breach in the levee system and many areas of the city flooded again (NOAA,
2005). The damages to Louisiana and Mississippi from Hurricane Katrina were catastrophic. The
calculated estimate for overall damage costs is approximately $125 billion, which includes $100
billion in U.S. Government expenditures and spending estimates from the insurance company
Munich RE (NOAA, 2005). The human death toll from Hurricane Katrina has been estimated at
1464, making it the third deadliest storm since 1900 (LMC, 2006. NOAA, 2005).
Figure 1. Path of Hurricane Katrina
Source: NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center- Technical Report 2005-01
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Many of those that died did not evacuate New Orleans, even though the storm was preceded by
an ordered mandatory evacuation and a declaration of emergency by the Mayor of the City of
New Orleans (CNN, 2005). Estimates are that over a million people evacuated the greater New
Orleans area, becoming essentially environmental refugees. This enormous migration of people
has been compared in magnitude to the number of people who fled the dust bowl of the 1930s in
the U.S. and has been called the largest migration of people in the history of the United States
(Grier, 2005).
Figure 2. Mississippi River Stages at New Orleans
Source: NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center- Technical Report 2005-01
Post Storm Damage Assessment
Data from the Office of Gulf Coast Rebuilding state that in Orleans Parish the number of
owner occupied and rental units categorized as major and severe/ destroyed from Hurricane
Katrina is 105,155, with the total number of units damaged at 134,344 (OGCR, 2006). This
 6
number of severe/destroyed units is more than half of the total number of homes destroyed in
Louisiana due to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The largest number of homes destroyed was
in New Orleans East (eastern New Orleans), which at one time was cypress swamp, as was much
of New Orleans. Additionally, the number of rental units destroyed is just higher than the
number of owner-occupied units. The total number of damaged units due to flooding is 107,379
which is approximately 80 percent of the total number of units damaged in Orleans Parish.
Approximately 95 percent of the total number of major/severe damaged units was from flooding.
Table 1. Number of Housing Units Damaged/Destroyed in Orleans Parish
Total Damaged Owner-Occupied Units 66,609
Total Flood Damaged Owner-Occupied
Units
53,908
Owner-Occupied Major/Severe Damaged
Units
53,474
Owner-Occupied Major/Severe Flood
Damaged Units
51,717
Total Damaged Rental Units 67,735
Total Flood Damaged Rental Units 53,471
Major/Severe Damaged Rental Units 51,681
Major/ Severe Flood Damaged Rental
Units
48,272
Total Number of Units damaged in Orleans
Parish
134,344
Total Number of Units Flood Damaged in
Orleans Parish
107,379
Total Number of Major/ Severe Damaged
Units for Orleans Parish
105,155
Source: Office of Gulf Coast Rebuilding 2-12-2006
Federal Disaster Assistance
President George W. Bush declared the gulf coast a disaster area on August 25, 2005,
which authorized the area, including New Orleans, to receive federal disaster assistance and
support through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Stafford Act (44
CFR) authorizes assistance to disaster areas once a national disaster declaration has been made
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by the President of the United States. The assistance can be given to public entities, such as
governments and nonprofit organizations, or to individuals in the form of housing or money for
housing, and rebuilding and mitigation costs. More immediately, the FEMA director can direct
any federal agency to use all of its resources to support state and local emergency assistance
efforts to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a
catastrophe, as was observed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as members of the United
States Military conducted search and rescue operations by helicopter, rescuing people stranded
on rooftops and repairing the broken levees, which caused the city to flood.
In New Orleans post Hurricane Katrina, FEMA implemented its housing program, which
has the intent to house the greatest number of people in the shortest time (44 CFR). Housing is
normally a check to cover housing expenses, but when existing housing (rental) resources are not
available or when repairs to the homes will not make them livable in a reasonable period of time,
FEMA may construct temporary housing sites to house applicants. These sites are usually groups
of travel trailers or mobile homes installed on a private piece of land leased by FEMA. These
sites are called Emergency Group Sites (EGS) (44 CFR). With the large number of homes
destroyed in Orleans Parish, the need for temporary housing assistance was enormous.
NEPA Compliance
The construction of housing for displaced residents of Hurricane Katrina by FEMA is
like any other federal action, subject to compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). This means that the actions of the federal government must undergo an environmental
review and comply with all federal, state, and local environmental laws and executive orders.
There have been emergency provisions implemented to expedite the NEPA process during
disasters, but an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement must be
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conducted; however most temporary housing projects are categorically excluded (Core, 2007).
This process of installing temporary housing in New Orleans post Hurricane Katrina highlighted
the regions environmental problems that span from the early development of New Orleans, the
city’s geography, and problems that arose in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
New Orleans Environmental History
The Mississippi River and other similar large river systems create land adjacent to their
courses via a process called delta switching. New Orleans and most of the land south of Baton
Rouge is part of the Mississippi River alluvial floodplain, which has been built up by the River
over the last several thousand years. This area was subjected to yearly spring floods, which
resulted in over-bank flooding and sediment deposition on the land adjacent to the main channel.
The natural levee is the title given to the highest portion of land immediately adjacent to the river
channel that was created as the floodwaters slowed and the sediments it carried settled out. This
natural levee, which occurs on both sides of the main river channel, is relatively higher than the
surrounding land, least susceptible to inundation, and first to emerge from subsiding floodwaters.
The City of New Orleans was founded on the natural levee of the Mississippi River, which was
about 12 feet above sea-level by Bienville (Johnson and Yodis, 1998). In New Orleans, the
natural levee slopes discernibly into the waterway and the land lowers in elevation from the crest
for about two miles toward Lake Ponchartrain, or away from the river (Figure 3).
The flood events in the lower Mississippi River during the early eighteenth century could
spread out several miles on each side of the main channel and stand there for months (Colten,
2005). The worst floods took place when crevasses, or breaches in the natural levee, formed and
allowed the areas farthest away from the natural levee, which were lower in elevation, to remain
inundated longer, forming the cypress swamps that signify Louisiana (Colten, 2005).
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Figure 3. Generalized Topographic Profile of New Orleans
Source: Geography of Louisiana, Johnson and Yodis, 1998
Upon human habitation of this area, the floods were destructive by shallow water
immersion, which could stand on the fields for months, creep into houses, and interrupt urban
life for extended periods of time (Colten, 2005). Additionally, the cypress swamps that
surrounded New Orleans contained alligators, mosquitoes, and in the minds of nineteenth-
century residents, pestilential emissions that threatened public health (Appendix B) (Colten,
2005).
These problems lead to the construction of earthen levees to confine the Mississippi
River within its banks and to the drainage of a large portion of the cypress swamps. Early in this
process though (circa 1727), a patchwork of levees was constructed that unintentionally allowed
some upstream floodwaters to escape and fill the backswamp areas, which would allow levee
protected areas of New Orleans to flood on a regular basis from the backside (Colten, 2005). The
backswamp flooding would fill the city’s lowest points between the Metairie and Gentilly Ridges
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and the river’s natural levee, an area commonly referred to as the “Bowl.” After flooding in 1816
(which caused people to flee their homes and left the city inundated for about a month), again in
1823, and a large flooding threat in 1828, Louisiana created the Office of the State Engineer.
The state engineers questioned the levees only policy and in 1846, the state engineer, P.O.
Hebert, stated the entire lower river and New Orleans were in “imminent danger of inundation”
annually (Hebert, 1846).
Even though the flooding continued, levees were improved and increased in size.
However, it was not until New Orleans had suffered multiple severe floods that the federal
government created the Mississippi River Commission in 1879 to create a federally designed
levee system to provide flood control (Currently the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is assigned
this task). This process did not prove to be immediate as the area also flooded in 1882 and 1890,
but it did transfer the responsibility of flood protection from the local and state governments to
the federal government (Colten, 2005).
The topography of the city of New Orleans not only made the city prone to river
flooding, but hurricane storm surges and high rainfall events were also burdens. Additionally,
Louisiana averages one landfalling hurricane per century with six of the past 14 in the last
century affecting New Orleans (NOAA, 2005). Hurricane storm surges bring excess water into
Lake Ponchartrain and threaten New Orleans from flooding this way. However, throughout time
and much like the process of river flooding, levees have been constructed along the lakefront to
prevent this flooding. However, much like the river’s levees, the lakefront levees do not have a
history of being successful. Much like the river’s levees, the lakefront levees do not have a
history of being successful. The lakefront levees have been overtopped and breached by past
hurricane storm surges.
11
The highest part of the city is the natural levee next to the river. The elevation of the city
decreases as one goes away from the natural levee, thus drainage could not be gravity driven into
the river. New Orleans relies on a man-made canal system of drainage that is driven by pumps
placing rainwater in lakes surrounding the city. There are about 200 miles of canals in New
Orleans leading to 22 pumping stations located in the low points of the city. These drainage
pumps have a maximum capacity of 35 billion gallons of water per day (Westerink, 2003).
The city is now mostly protected from river floods (Westerink, 2003). It is hurricane
storm surges that provide the greatest threat. Since the city’s drainage system pumps to Lake
Ponchartrain, when there is ample rainfall in the city and a large storm surge into Lake
Ponchartrain, pumping water out of the city becomes a problem and water may come from the
lake up the canals into the city to cause flooding, as was seen in Hurricane Katrina.
Industrial History
The City of New Orleans has an industrial history that was also highlighted in the events
following Hurricane Katrina. The floodwaters that inundated the city were immediately labeled a
“toxic soup” by media outlets (Pardue, 2005). This title was given due to the many industrial
facilities and superfund sites that were flooded in the storm, possibly introducing harmful
chemicals and pathogens into the floodwater. Additionally, once the floodwater was pumped out
of the city, it left behind a layer of sediment over most of the flooded areas that could have
harbored contaminants. However, the “toxic soup” claim was proved to be false by extensive
testing (EPA, 2005. Pardue, 2005).
Increasing Frequency of Intense of Storms
Hurricanes are the cause of many natural disasters for coastal communities and have
accounted for the costliest natural disasters in U.S. history (Emanuel, 2005). Coastal
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communities are also threatened by sea level rise due to a warming planet and changing climate
(IPCC, 2007). A recent study conducted by Webster et al. indicated that over the past 35 years in
an environment of increasing sea surface temperature, the proportion of storms reaching
categories 4 and 5 is increasing (Webster et al, 2005). Kerry Manuel’s recent study of the last
thirty years of hurricane activity correlates storm intensity with tropical sea surface temperature
(SSTs) (Manuel, 2005). When this is considered with the warming expected from
anthropocentric global climate change, one would expect to see a substantial increase in
hurricane related losses in the twenty-first century (Manuel, 2005). Additionally, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated “based on a range of models, it is
likely that future tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense, with
larger peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation associated with ongoing increases of
tropical SSTs” (IPCC, 2007).
Demographic Shift to the Coasts
The natural resources, diverse habitat types, abundant species, and nutrients that are
located in coastal communities support a wealth of economic activity. Recreation, employment,
waterborne commerce, and energy and mineral extraction are all drivers of population migration
to coastal areas (Bookman et al, 1999). However, this population growth in coastal communities
is making the coastal ecosystems and the services they provide more vulnerable to pollution,
habitat degradation and loss, overfishing, and invasive species.
In 2003 approximately 153 million people lived (53 percent of the U.S. population) lived
in the 673 coastal counties of the U.S., which is an increase of 33 million since 1980 (NOAA,
2004). Additionally, 10 out of the 15 largest cities in the U.S. are coastal cities. Globally, about
1.2 billion people (23% of the world’s population) live within 62 miles of the coast and 50
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percent are likely to do so by 2030 (Small & Nichols, 2003). The coastal population in the U.S.
is expected to increase a great deal by 2008. These population trends, when considered with the
increasing coastal hazards from global climate change, will expose an increasing number of
people to specific hazards, such as coastal flooding and hurricanes and should make policy
makers plan for the future with adaptations or mitigation techniques to avoid catastrophic losses.
Hydrologic Alteration
The levees that protect the city of New Orleans from flooding have also brought about
some unintended consequences. Historically, the Mississippi River provided freshwater,
nutrients, and a sediment supply to the wetlands and areas in the floodplain in Louisiana. This
was vital to the maintenance of these wetlands as the soils decompose and subside over time and
to keep the saltwater from intruding from the Gulf of Mexico. When the levees were built,
keeping the Mississippi River in its channel, these maintaining functions were halted and the
land began to sink (Figure 4).
Additionally, when the levees were installed and the leveed areas pumped dry, the high
moisture content peaty soils subsided and compacted as the water was removed (Dixon et al,
2006. Day, 2005). This process has placed many areas that were cypress swamps, now leveed
and drained, below sea level. This can be seen in the elevations of the areas in New Orleans East,
which was historically cypress swamp. This process has made the developed areas in New
Orleans even more dependent on the levees to protect them from flooding.
The wetland marshes that are a buffer from hurricane storm surges and provide habitat
for the fishes that supply Louisiana’s fishing industry, are disappearing at an alarming rate due to
the same processes listed above. The hydrology of the marshes has also been changed as oil and
gas canals were dredged in the marsh, which allowed saltwater to intrude killing, freshwater
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marsh. Other navigation canals, such as the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Canal, have also
contributed to the loss of the Louisiana wetlands.
Figure 4. Effect of Artificial Levees on the Stage of the Mississippi River
Source: Geography of Louisiana, Johnson and Yodis, 1998
Since the 1930’s one million acres of wetlands have been lost and converted to open
water in Louisiana. Without bold action another one million acres will disappear in the next 40
years. This equates to roughly one football field lost every thirty minutes (CFCL, 2002). These
lost wetlands have protected New Orleans and other Louisiana coastal communities from
hurricane storm surges and fed the coastal economy as it has developed over time. Now, this lost
resource has made these same communities more vulnerable to hurricane hazards and decreases
its social-ecological resiliency (Adger et al, 2005).
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Review of Introductory Material
This chapter has presented an overview of the events of Hurricane Katrina and
highlighted the existing environmental history of Orleans Parish and the Louisiana coast that led
up to the disaster and factors that may have influenced the response. These factors not only
played a role in the response after the storm, but also have shaped the city and the surrounding
areas over time. The research objectives of this thesis have also been described. The next chapter
presents the regulatory framework that shaped the response to Hurricane Katrina in Orleans
Parish.
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CHAPTER 2
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the U.S. Congress with
the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. The NFIP is a federal program that
allows property owners in participating communities to purchase insurance as protection against
flood losses. For a community to participate in the NFIP, it must enact state and community
floodplain management regulations to reduce the risk of future losses from flooding.
Participation in the NFIP is dependent on an agreement between the federal government and
communities. To participate in the NFIP, communities must enact and enforce a floodplain
management ordinance that reduces future flood risks to new construction in floodplains. In
return the federal government will make flood insurance available in that participating
community to act as financial protection from future flood losses. The flood insurance provided
by the NFIP is in place to provide an insurance alternative to disaster assistance. The NFIP is
also in place to avoid the escalating costs of flood damages to buildings and their contents due to
being located in the floodplain (NFIP, 2002).
Before the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, the federal
government’s primary response to flooding was the use of structural methods to control flooding,
such as dams and levees. Major riverine flood disasters of the 1920’s and 1930’s led to the
passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936, which involved the federal government in the
protection of life and property by installing structural flood control projects. However, after
billions of federal dollars were invested in flood control structures, the losses to life and property
and the amount of assistance to disaster victims from floods continued to increase (NFIP, 2002).
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In the early 1950’s the idea of private insurance companies providing flood insurance
was studied by the federal government. It became clear that private insurance companies could
not profitably provide flood insurance coverage at an affordable price due to the catastrophic
nature of flooding and the inability to develop an actuarial rate structure which could accurately
reflect the flood risk to which properties are exposed (NFIP, 2002).
These activities led to the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 1973,
and National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994. This new legislation not only provided
federally subsidized flood insurance to existing buildings in NFIP participating communities, but
required that all federal agencies and federally insured or regulated lenders require flood
insurance on all grants and loans for acquisition or construction of buildings in designated
Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs)(NFIP, 2002). The SFHA is the area of land in the flood
plain subject to a one percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year, also known as the
100 year flood. The 1994 legislation also established a Flood Mitigation Assistance grant
program to help states and communities develop mitigation plans and implement measures to
reduce future flood damages to structures (NFIP, 2002). The mandatory insurance requirement
was added after Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972, which caused extensive riverine flooding along
the east coast. From this tropical storm, the federal government identified that few property
owners in the floodplain were insured and the federal subsidized flood insurance was not
sufficient encouragement for communities to join the NFIP and property owners to purchase
flood insurance. However, the mandatory flood insurance requirement resulted in a dramatic
increase in the number of communities participating in the NFIP (NFIP, 2002).
The NFIP is administered by the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration within
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The NFIP subsidized insurance is funded
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by the National Flood Insurance Fund, which is funded by a fee assessed on flood insurance
policies. However, the program does have the authorization to borrow up to 1.5 Billion from the
U.S. Treasury. The funds are used to provide the basic components of the program: identifying
and mapping flood prone communities, requiring that participating communities adopt floodplain
management regulations, the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, and the subsidized flood
insurance (NFIP, 2002).
The NFIP uses the 1-percent-annual-chance flood as the basis for (also known as the
“100 year flood” or the base flood) risk assessment, insurance rating, and floodplain
management, and has been used since the inception of the NFIP. The 1-percent annual chance
flood has a statistical probability of being equaled or exceeded in any given year, or a 1 in 4
chance of occurring over the life of a 30 year mortgage (26 percent) (NFIP, 2002). The
floodways are determined by FEMA using two methods: approximate and detailed. Once the
floodways are determined, the data is placed on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and
provided to the public. These maps are used to manage floodplains, assess risk, and calculate
flood insurance rates (NFIP, 2002).
Seventy-five percent of the FIRMs across the U.S. are more than 10 years old. Since
flood risks usually increase over time with development and are dynamic, the old maps
underestimate actual flood hazards. The primary reason the maps are antiquated is insufficient
agency funding. In 1997, FEMA developed a plan to modernize the FIRMs to provide a more
accurate risk to communities, but to 2002 no funding has been appropriated to accomplish this
(NFIP, 2002).
The ordinance requirements for communities to participate in the NFIP are estimated to
save over one billion dollars annually in avoided losses to structures built after the development
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of the NFIP. Communities participating in the NFIP are required to regulate all development in
the SFHAs. This means before a development takes place in a SFHA the community is to review
the proposal to ensure it complies with the community’s floodplain ordinance and ensure all
other permits from state or federal agencies have been obtained. The community’s review of all
new proposed development is to ensure the proposed development proposals are reasonably safe
from flooding hazards and the utilities and facilities servicing these developments are
constructed in a manner to minimize or eliminate flood damage. In general, this requires at
minimum that new construction and substantially damaged existing buildings in A Zones
(riverine or coastal flood zones) to have the lowest floor elevated to or above Base Flood
Elevation (BFE) and buildings in the V Zone (storm surge zone) be elevated on piles and
columns so the bottom of the lowest horizontal structural member of the lowest floor of all new
construction or substantially improved construction existing buildings must be elevated to or
above BFE.
Additionally, the communities are required to adopt a regulatory floodway in riverine A
Zones. This chosen area must be designed to carry the waters of the 1-percent-annual-chance
flood without increasing the water surface elevation of that flood more than one foot at any
point. Once the floodway is chosen, the community must prohibit development in that floodway
that could cause any increase in flood heights. The designated area usually includes the river
channel and adjacent floodplain areas that contain forests and wetlands. The requirement has the
effect of limiting development in the most hazardous and environmentally sensitive part of the
floodplain.
In New Orleans, some areas are not considered to be zoned in the floodplain because they
are protected from the 100 year flood by levee or dike. FEMA does not fund levees, but has
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standards for levees that must be met before a property’s flood risk status can be changed (NFIP,
2002).
The federally subsidized flood insurance and the land-use ordinance requirements for
NFIP participating communities are drastically different from the earlier responses of the federal
government, which primarily responded with structural methods to control flooding, such as
dams and levees (NFIP, 2002).
Federal Emergency Management Agency
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is one of the four main branches
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It was put under the DHS in March of 2003.
FEMA has approximately 2,500 full-time employees and 5,000 disaster aid reservists whose
stated mission is “to lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disasters
with a vision of ‘A Nation Prepared’" (www.fema.gov).
FEMA was once an independent agency that has history of piecemeal legislation,
increasing its role and function. It can trace its origins back to the Congressional Act of 1803,
which is considered the first piece of disaster legislation. Since then many natural disasters
prompted several pieces of legislation giving more than 100 different agencies some role in
disaster preparation and response. This process became problematic and in 1979 President
Jimmy Carter signed an executive order merging many of the different entities into one agency-
FEMA (www.fema.gov).
One of FEMA’s many roles is to provide temporary housing to disaster victims, which is
the role I will focus on in this thesis. Temporary housing assistance is made available to
applicants who require temporary housing due to a major disaster or emergency that is declared
by the president (44 CFR 206). Eligibility is based on the disaster related unlivability of a
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primary residence or other disaster related displacement. Temporary housing normally consists
of a check to cover housing related costs wherever possible. The exceptions to this monetary
assistance are when existing rental properties are not available, when repairs to the home will not
make it livable in a reasonable period of time, or when the applicant cannot physically leave the
home due to the need to tend livestock or crops. However, immediately following a disaster
victims are expected to stay with family, friends, or mass shelters.
When the rental resources are not present, FEMA may install mobile homes, travel
trailers, or other manufactured housing units on federally leased commercial, private, or group
sites (two or more units) as was done in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Travel trailers and
mobile homes were placed in group sites, on the front lawns of private residences (known as haul
and install trailers), and in existing commercial trailer parks. The installation of the trailers and
parks must comply with applicable state and local codes and ordinances, and with 44 CFR Part
9: Floodplain Management and Protection of Wetlands and 44 CFR Part 10: Environmental
Considerations.
44 CFR Part 9 Executive Orders 11988 and 11990
44 CFR Part 9 outlines the procedures for FEMA to comply with its NEPA requirements
and with Executive Orders 11988 and 11990. Executive Order 11988’s purpose is to avoid
adverse impacts associated with modification of floodplains (44 CFR Part 9). Executive Order
11990’s purpose is to avoid the destruction and modification of wetlands (44 CFR Part 9).The
Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 were signed by President Jimmy Carter on May 24, 1977.
The 44 CFR Part 9.2 states “FEMA shall take no action unless and until the requirements of this
regulation are complied with.”
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Table 2. Summarized Policy of 44 CFR Part 9 (Section 9.2)
FEMA shall take no action unless and until the requirements of this regulation are complied
with.
It is the policy of the Agency to provide leadership in floodplain management and the
protection of wetlands. Further, the Agency shall integrate the goals of the Orders to the
greatest possible degree into its procedures for implementing NEPA.
The Agency shall take action to: Avoid long- and short-term adverse impacts associated
with
the Occupancy and modification of floodplains and the destruction and modification of
wetlands;
The Agency shall take action to: Avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain
development
and new construction in wetlands wherever there is a practicable alternative;
The Agency shall take action to: Reduce the risk of flood loss;
The Agency shall take action to: Promote the use of nonstructural flood protection methods
to reduce the risk of flood loss;
The Agency shall take action to: Minimize the impact of floods on human health, safety and
welfare;
The Agency shall take action to: Minimize the destruction, loss or degradation of wetlands;
The Agency shall take action to: Restore and preserve the natural and beneficial values
served by floodplains;
The Agency shall take action to: Preserve and enhance the natural values of wetlands;
The Agency shall take action to: Involve the public throughout the floodplain management
and wetlands protection decision-making process;
The Agency shall take action to: Adhere to the objectives of the Unified National Program
for Floodplain Management; and
The Agency shall take action to: Improve and coordinate the Agency’s plans, programs,
Functions and resources so that the Nation may attain the widest range of beneficial uses of
the environment without degradation or risk to health and safety.
Please note that when no other alternative action is available, FEMA may take actions in
the floodplain (A Zone). Further action and documentation is required, such as the 8 step
process. FEMA must show that no other feasible options exist. This was the case in New
Orleans, as most of the city is in the floodplain. Additionally, in south Louisiana after Hurricane
Katrina, travel trailers were allowed to be placed in the floodplain, but mobile homes were not
allowed by FEMA. In theory, the travel trailers are more temporary than mobile homes and they
can be moved out of floodways if another hazard arises. , Furthermore, they do not have to be
elevated above base flood elevation (Core, 2007).
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44 CFR Part 10 Environmental Considerations
This section of 44 CFR requires FEMA officials to be informed and take into account the
environmental considerations when authorizing or approving major FEMA actions that
significantly affect the environment of the U.S. This part puts forth the process for FEMA to
comply with NEPA. It ensures all FEMA actions are consistent with national environmental
policies.
Environmental Review Requirement
The first step in the NEPA process is to determine whether an Environmental Assessment
(EA) or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) should be prepared; there are criteria set forth in
44 CFR Part 10 explaining this. It is important to note that an EA or EIS can be triggered by an
action that is expected to be controversial. However, for actions that do not individually or
cumulatively have a significant impact on the human environment, an EA or EIS is not required.
Part 44 CFR 1508.4 also provides for Categorical Exclusions (CATEXs) (44 CFR Part 10.8),
which are actions that have minimal or no effect on the environment, no significant change to
existing environmental quality, and those that will have no significant cumulative environmental
impact. FEMA has composed a list of actions that are authorized to be categorically excluded,
which includes the installation one unit of temporary housing on private land. Installing more
than one unit will require the actions environmental impacts to be considered.
This process was implemented for temporary housing in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
I will now briefly describe the process as explained to me by Chelsea Core, FEMA
Environmental Specialist, on February 2, 2007, who worked in the recovery operations of
Hurricane Katrina (Core, 2007). In the wake of the storm, housing costs plus construction
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contracts were given out to three major contractors- Shaw, Fluor, and CH2MHill- which sent out
strike teams into the devastated areas, assessing potential temporary housing sites. The contractor
would submit the sites to FEMA with a rough site construction plan, including the number of
housing units and utility designs.
Per a conversation with Richard Beatty, Deputy Environmental Liaison Officer for
FEMA Environmental in Baton Rouge, this process was different from what was done in the
response to Hurricane Charlie in Florida. In the response to Hurricane Charlie, local government
officials, USACE personnel, and FEMA personnel were sent out to find potential housing sites
(Beatty, 2007).This would exclude some sites that did not meet certain criteria early in the
process (Beatty, 2007).
Once the contractors’ report was given to FEMA, FEMA Environmental personnel began
the environmental review process. FEMA sent out field inspection team to assess the
environmental impacts of the proposed actions. This information was recorded in a document
titled “Site Visit Report.” Additional background research was also done on potential sites,
including historical sanborn map research, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
(LDEQ) hazardous materials record searches, FirstSearch hazardous materials record searches,
and historical/archaeological database searches. If the site had an issue of concern, such as
potential wetlands, or endangered species, further consultation was required and documented.
Wetlands consultations were done by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and threatened and
endangered species consultations were done by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Historical
issues were consulted on with the State Historical Preservation Office (SHPO). If any potential
hazardous materials were encountered, testing was conducted and the issue remedied or the site
was avoided.
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All Environmental Assessments (EA) had to have a consultation with each respective
agency. If the EA was found to have a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), the document
(of the same name) was prepared, signed, put out for public access, and a public notice was
placed in the local papers. Also, a blanket public notice was placed early in the disaster for
CATEXs for temporary housing. CATEXs were also reviewed by FEMA Officials and signed by
the proper approving Official.
Figure 5. FEMA Site Selection Process Flow Diagram
Source: Compiled by Author
The FEMA Environmental review was only one step in the process. The site had to be
approved by local politicians, FEMA housing officials, and a lease had to be signed between the
landowner and the General Services Administration (GSA). Once all these factors were satisfied
the site was given the authorization and funding to be constructed (Core, 2007).
Site Selection Process
Contractor Submits Site to FEMA
FEMA Environmental Inspects/ Researches Site
Site Acceptable/ Feasible Site Not Acceptable/Feasible
No Further ActionEA or CATEX Determination
Site Proceeds to 100% Design; GSA
Negotiates Lease with Landowner, City
Council & Mayor Approval Required
50% Design in Process
Necessary Consultations
NEPA Documentation Completed
Site Proceeds to Construction
X
26
Summary of Regulatory Framework
Chapter 2 contains a general description of the policies related to the role NEPA has in
the housing response of Hurricane Katrina, and the role the NFIP has in protecting people from
flooding. The data collected by FEMA Environmental, in compliance with these laws, is what I
will use to establish my methodology in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED RESEARCH
Hurricane and Flooding Hazards in New Orleans
In the article titled “The Creeping Storm” Westerink and Luettich (2003) explain the
vulnerabilities of New Orleans to hurricanes. This paper was published in 2003, well before
Hurricane Katrina was heard of. The authors present that the levees around the north side of (on
Lake Ponchartrain) New Orleans were built and engineered by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers based on what was called a standard project hurricane (sph), which is equivalent to
what would be a fast-moving category three storm on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. This was after
Hurricane Betsy pummeled New Orleans and congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1965,
which appropriated funds to increase the height of the city’s levees. The idea was to create a
rough semicircle on the lake to protect the city from storm surges from the lake. Following this,
other levees, floodwalls, or both would also have to be constructed around the city’s drainage
canals, pumping stations and bridges. They explain that this program spiraled out of control and
in 1986 more funds were appropriated to build levees around the southern part of the city. This
process is ongoing and is not expected to be complete until 2018. They explain that it has just
become a fact of life that the people of New Orleans live most of their lives in a city below sea
level.
The authors point out that numerous computer models indicate that if a Category 4 or 5
storm were to hit New Orleans the levees would easily be over topped. One model specifically,
states the city streets could be filled with water to a depth of 25 feet. Under this scenario, the
American Red Cross estimates between 25,000 and 100,000 people would die.
28
This idea of New Orleans being vulnerable to a strong hurricane is not a new idea. This
idea has been put forth in the past by Fishcetti (2001), McQuaid (2002), Laska (2004), Laska et
al (2005) and Colten (2005). Additionally, the idea of the funnel effect taking place from a strong
storm surge coming through the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Canal (MRGO) and the levees
being overtopped, flooding the city were identified in the FEMA exercise titled “Hurricane Pam”
in 2004 (http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/newsrelated/incaseofemrgencyexercise.htm).
Contaminates Pre-Hurricane Katrina
Being an historic city, the soil around the City of New Orleans was not equal in terms of
contaminate concentrations before Hurricane Katrina. Certain sections of the city have high soil
concentration levels of lead, arsenic, and other hazardous chemicals (NPR, 2007) The lead
concentrations are due to a combination of activities, such as high traffic roads when leaded
gasoline was used, industrial activity, and the removal lead paint in homes (NPR, 2007). It is
mainly the older neighborhoods, such as downtown, that have the elevated levels of lead and
arsenic and the lower ninth ward (NPR, 2007). It is known that New Orleans has specific areas in
the city of contaminant “hot spots.” The contaminants to be found in high concentrations in the
downtown area of New Orleans are lead, arsenic, cadmium, and other metals (Plumlee et al,
2006).
Soil surveys of Lead done by Mielke (1993) indicate a higher concentration in the inner
city and a decrease as one goes toward the suburban areas. Mielke has also shown that the high
soil lead concentrations have caused increased blood concentrations of lead in the children who
play in these areas (Mielke et al, 1997). These contaminants are believed to be the residue of
decades of industrial activity in the city (Plumlee et al, 2006).
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Contaminants Post-Hurricane Katrina
The initial media reports that the floodwaters of Hurricane Katrina were a “toxic soup”
generated a fair amount of research. In addition to the extensive floodwater and sediment testing
conducted by the EPA (http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/index.html), many academics did
the same. The research indicates that the title of toxic soup was not warranted.
However, the testing conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the
floodwater and sediment found two areas of sediment samples that had levels higher than
acceptable standards for Arsenic and Lead (EPA, 2005). The floodwater testing found numerous
harmful chemicals that were elevated above acceptable drinking water levels, but were
determined to not be a hazard to human health as the ingestion of floodwater should not have
been occurring (EPA, 2005). Additionally, post flooding soil testing by Howard Mielke of
Xavier University, has shown that the flood waters did not change the historic contaminant levels
in the areas sampled, meaning the storm did not conceal any contaminants or transport them
away (Mielke, 2006). Nevertheless, contaminated soil and the possibility of contaminated
sediments left by the floodwaters were factors that had to be considered in the post Hurricane
Katrina response.
Global Climate Change and Increasing Intensity of Storms
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently published its Fourth
Assessment (2007). The IPCC’s Assessments have worked to decrease the uncertainty associated
with anthropocentric global warming. The most recent Fourth Assessment stated:
“Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous
oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and
now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many
thousands of years. The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due
primarily to fossil fuel use and land-use change, while those of methane and
nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.”
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Additionally, the IPCC has noted that Arctic Antarctic ice cover will shrink, sea-level
will rise, the oceans will become more acidic, hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation
events are to become more frequent, sea-surface temperatures are to continue to increase,
tropical cyclones are expected to increase in intensity, and precipitation is expected to increase at
high latitudes and decrease are expected at in most subtropical land regions, a trend that has
already been observed.
An increasing trend of hurricane intensity has already been identified worldwide. Manuel
(2005) identified a 60 percent increase in the total amount of energy released by hurricanes
worldwide in the last twenty years. Additionally, Manuel (2005) noted that hurricane activity
over the last thirty years correlates storm intensity to sea surface temperature (SSTs). Another
recent publication by Webster et al (2005) noted that over the last 35 years in relation to
warming SSTs, the proportion of storms reaching Saffir-Simpson Scale Category 4 and 5 is
increasing. These publications are consistent with the idea that increasing sea surface
temperatures increase water vapor in the air over the ocean, and these two factors increase the
energy available for all storms, from thunderstorms to hurricanes (Flannery, 2005. Emanuel,
1987).
Currently, the increasing number of storms, as seen in the real world, does not agree with
computer climate models. This discrepancy has been suggested by some that global warming is
not responsible for the increased storms; however, others state that the computer global
circulation models are deeply conservative (Flannery, 2005). Nevertheless, the increased number
of storms has caused some to ask the question whether Hurricane Katrina is a harbinger of more
powerful hurricanes (Kerr, 2005).
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Cities are manifestations of their climate, meaning they depend on the services the
climate provides. Changes in climate can change the topography of our planet and leave cities
more vulnerable to hurricanes. Topographical changes, such as the washing away of the
Chandeleur Islands, a barrier island chain that once protected the Louisiana coast from tropical
storm surges, is an example of this (Flannery, 2005). These expected changes in climate will play
a large role in disaster response and planning in coastal communities.
Figure 6. Number of Tropical Cyclone by Year 1960 Through 2005
Source: NOAA, 2005
Coastal Resiliency
Walker & Salt (2006) state,“Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance
and still retain its basic function and structure.” This concept applies to both social and
ecological systems. The level of resilience is a reflection of the degree to which a complex
adaptive system is capable of self-organizing and the degree to which the system can build
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capacity for learning and adaptation (Adger, 2005. Folke et al, 2002. Carpenter et al, 2001).
Adger et al (2005) put for the concept of social-ecological resilience, which is the idea that social
systems are dependent on ecological systems, which are vulnerable to disasters and should be
managed to increase the capacity to absorb recurrent disturbances such as hurricanes or floods to
retain essential structures, processes, and feedbacks. This idea is a more realistic viewpoint
targeted at sustaining and enhancing the capacity of social-ecological systems to adapt to
uncertainty and surprise than the traditional perspective that attempts to control changes in
systems that are assumed to be stable (Adger et al, 2005).
Adger et al (2005) put forth the idea that most hazards in coastal areas become disasters
through erosion of natural resilience mechanisms driven by human actions and environmental
change. Adger et al (2005) also puts for the idea that the incremental decreasing change in
resilience may go unnoticed until a crisis occurs. An example of this is that chronic overfishing
and declining water quality around coral reefs have made them more vulnerable to cyclones and
global warming. Examples of natural barriers that reduced vulnerability to areas in the 2004
Asian tsunami areas given by Adger et al (2005) are sand dunes, mangrove forests, and coral
reefs. Examples of social resilience mechanisms are institutions for collective action, robust
governance systems, and a diversity of livelihood choices, which promote social reorganization
after disturbance and regulate natural barriers to increase resilience (Adger et al, 2005).
Wetland Loss/ Natural Barriers to Disasters
Louisiana’s wetlands represent 40 percent of the wetlands in the U.S.
(http://marine.usgs.gov/marine/fact-sheets/Wetlands/index.html). Louisiana is losing its
wetlands at a rate of 75 km per year. So far Louisiana has lost one million acres since the 1930s
and even more were lost due to the hurricane so 2005 (CFCL, 2002, USGS, 2005). These lost
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wetlands dampen storm surges. This loss of wetlands has been noted for decades (Craig et al,
1979). These wetlands are also important to the states economy, as they shelter critical oil and
gas infrastructure, are the breeding grounds for its large fishery ($1 Billion/yr), and contain
several national historic places and landmarks (Laska et al, 2005). Additionally, the levees that
protect much of Louisiana, and especially New Orleans, are also what have made it vulnerable
by confining the Mississippi River in its channel, removing the flood events that have
historically provided the freshwater and sediments that were deposited to offset the city’s
subsiding soils and maintain the coastal wetland buffers that protect it (Templet & Meyer-
Arendt, 1988).
A plan to restore the Mississippi Delta’s wetlands has been composed by the Louisiana
Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and the Wetlands Conservation and
Restoration Authority, which is titled Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana
(www.lacoast.gov). Additionally, a revenue sharing bill to give Louisiana royalties on outer
continental shelf energy extraction has recently been signed into law, which should give
Louisiana $106 million in 2007 and increase every year afterwards (Alpert, 2006).
Summary of Related Research
This chapter has presented research related to New Orleans’ geographical problems,
environmental problems, and issues that are relevant to future hurricanes and disaster
preparedness in the future. The research provided here supplies the needed background
information on the environment where the disaster and its response took place.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODS
To gain more insight into the factors associated with temporary housing sites being
approved and built or not being approved, several types of data were collected for statistical
analysis. A total of nineteen independent variables were considered, of which three were
socioeconomic/demographic factors. The dependent variable was whether or not the site was
built.
Data Description
A Freedom of Information Act Request was submitted to FEMA for documents
containing data on group temporary housing sites in Orleans Parish that were considered for use,
in construction, or in use from the day Louisiana was declared a federal disaster area to January
15, 2006. Of the temporary housing site information provided to me, I selected a random sample
of 50 sites out of the total 123 sites considered by FEMA.
The documents provided to me on these 50 sites were the site visit reports FEMA
personnel completed upon visiting these sites. These reports contained the site address, site size,
current land use, surrounding land use, whether or not the site had possible wetlands, whether or
not the site was in a floodplain, whether the site contained threatened or endangered species or
their habitat, whether the site was in a historic district or archaeological artifacts were observed
during inspection, whether or not any potential hazardous materials were observed during the site
inspection, and the proposed activity on the site, including the number of units.
The socioeconomic/demographic independent variables used were median property
value, median household income, and percentage of the population that was black by the five-
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digit postal zip codes. The demographic data was obtained via the U.S. Census Bureau website
(http://factfinder.census.gov).
The additional information provided to me was a list of all the temporary housing sites
that were constructed in Orleans Parish. The dependent variable for this analysis is whether or
not the proposed site was successfully developed.
Data Coding
Site Data
Table 3. Independent Variables (Continuous)
1 Amount: the proposed number of units to be installed
2 Acreage: size of the site in acres
3 Median Property Value: median value of single-family owner-occupied homes in
US dollars (2000)
4 Median household income: U.S. dollars (2000)
5 African-American: Percentage of black population per 2000 Census
Table 4. Independent Variables (Nominal)
1 Existing Land Use: Farmland: 0 or 1 (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
2 Existing Land Use: Undisturbed: 0 or 1
3 Existing Land Use: Residential: 0 or 1
4 Existing Land Use: Commercial: 0 or 1
5 Existing Land Use: Park (greenspace or playground): 0 or 1
6 Floodplain Status: (in the floodplain or not) 0 or 1
7 Possible Wetlands: (present or not) 0 or 1
8 Threatened or Endangered Species Present: 0 or 1
9 Hazardous Material(s) Issue: 0 or 1
10 HazMat Issue from PreKatrina: 0 or 1
11 HazMat Issue from PostKatrina: 0 or 1
12 Historic District Status/ Archeological Potential: (in or not) 0 or 1
13 Did the site pass FEMA’s Environmental Review: 0 or 1
14 NEPA documentation required- CATEX: 0 or 1
15 NEPA documentation required- EA: 0 or 1
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Methods
The values of the independent variables reflecting the site information and
socioeconomic/ demographic data of the 50 sites in the random sample were entered into the
statistical analysis software program, SPSS, with a dependent variable indicative of the site being
approved and built. The data was analyzed using the following tests:
1. Difference of means comparison for continuous data
2. ANOVA significance test (p value)
3. Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis for the nominal data (yes=1 or no=0)
The difference of means comparison seeks to identify influences on the decision whether
to approve and build a site. The dependent variable was used to split the data into two sections:
those that were approved and built, and those that were not built. Then, the means were taken for
each of the continuous independent variables for each section of data (built and not built) and
compared to each other. Observing the data this way may provide insight into how the temporary
housing sites were approved and constructed or disapproved. Also, by comparing the data this
way, we may identify differences or similarities in property size, proposed number of units,
median income, median property value, and percent of population black between approved and
constructed sites and not built sites.
An ANOVA Oneway analysis was then conducted to identify the statistically significant
differences or similarities between the difference of means test. This will identify which factors
are reliable differences and not just anomalies. This figure will tell us how certain we are that a
difference or a relationship really exists.
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Then the nominal independent variables were included in Phi Coefficient of Correlation
Analysis to indicate whether or not a statistically significant relationship or association between
each independent variable and the dependent variable exists.
Review of Methodology
This chapter presented the process taken to obtain the data relevant to the research
objectives of this research and a discussion of the statistical testing has been provided. The
results of the testing will be provided in chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
Results and Findings
As stated earlier, the process to implement temporary housing, which was described in
chapter 2, is a fairly complex process that involves many entities and issues. These statistical
results will hopefully give more insight into the process and any issues that may have delayed the
temporary housing response to help make future implementations more efficient and
environmentally sound.
The results of the data analysis are found in the following tables. Table 2 displays the
results of the Difference of Means Comparison with the statistical significance for the
independent variables provided by the ANOVA Oneway Analysis. Table 3 displays the results of
the Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis.
Table 5. Difference of Means Comparison Results
Independent
Variable
Variable
Means for
Built Sites
Variable Means
for Non-Built
Sites
Data Set
Mean Values
City of New
Orleans Data
Proposed Number of
Units
45.22 127.40* 96.58
Size of the Site
(Acres)
2.39 6.27* 4.81
Median Income (in
thousands)
23.89 27.93 26.48 27.13
Median Property
Value (in thousands)
97.67 88.88 92.04 87.30
Percent of Population
Black
66.78 70.32 69.05 67.30
* indicates significance at <0.1
Difference of Means Results
The results of the difference of means for the proposed number of units, the acreage of
the site, median income, median property value, and the percent of the population black between
the built and non-built sites identified two variables with statistically significant differences
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between the means. The statistically significant differences are between the proposed number of
units to be installed and the size of the sites in acres.
Table 6. Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis Results (nominal by nominal)
Independent Variable by Dependent Variable (Site Built)
Independent Variable Phi Cramer’s V Contingency Coefficient
Undisturbed 0.188 0.188 0.185
Residential -0.361 0.361 0.340**
Commercial 0.216 0.216 0.211
Park/Green Space 0.011 0.011 0.011
Floodplain Status 0.099 0.099 0.098
Wetland Status 0.169 0.169 0.167
T&E Species Habitat
Status
- - -
Hazmat Status -0.190 0.190 0.187
Hazmat Pre-Katrina -0.285 0.285 0.274**
Hazmat Post-Katrina 0.189 0.189 0.186
Historic Status 0.372 0.372 0.349**
Environmental Status 0.337 0.337 0.319**
PCE (CATEX) 0.227 0.227 0.222
EA -0.227 0.227 0.222
* indicates significance at <0.1
** indicates significance at <0.05
Additionally, the median income and percent of the population that is black of the entire city of
New Orleans, and the difference of means variables are somewhat close in number, indicating
the sites either built or not built, were close representations of the entire city. This assumption
can be challenged with respect to the built and non-built sites means of median property value, as
these means were approximately ten thousand dollars higher than the city median.
Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis
A Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis was then performed to identify a relationship
or association between the site built dependent variable and the nominal level context variables.
The Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis revealed several associations between variables that
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were statistically significant. On this test a significance factor of 0.1 or less and 0.5 or less was
considered statistically significant, giving a 90 percent and 95 percent certainty respectively.
Associations between the site being built and the site being in a historic district and the
site passing the environmental review were significant with at least 95 percent certainty. Inverse
associations were identified between the site being built and having a Pre-Katrina hazardous
material issue and the site being residential at the 95 percent certainty level. The inverse
relationship between the site being residential and being built was probably due to the fact that
none of the sites built in the random sample were built on residential properties. The reasons for
this are unknown. Only 8 of the sites that were not built failed the environmental review. This
finding indicates that there was another factor or factors involved in the process. The other
factors involved could be lack of New Orleans City Council approval, lack of approval of the
Mayor of New Orleans, or GSA being unable to negotiate a lease with the landowner (Core,
2007). The site passing the environmental review is required for construction, so the finding of
this being significant is consistent with what is expected.
It is also important to note that the reason the temporary housing operation was taking
place was due to flooding. However, there was no significant relationship between the site being
located in the floodplain and it being approved. Although, 18 of the 50 sites in the random
sample were located in the floodplain and of the 18, 13 of them were built.
Additionally, there was no statistically significant association with wetlands even though
there are large amounts of wetlands located in Orleans Parish due to the areas history, hydrology,
and geography.
The lack of a negative association between Environmental Assessments (EAs) and the
site being built is also an interesting finding. The sites that require an EA are usually larger, more
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politically sensitive, and have an individual public comment period. It would seem that this
would be where the “NIMBY” (Not in My Back Yard) issues would show up in the analysis, but
as shown, they did not. In contrast, the sites that are categorically excluded do not get an
individual comment period, which would to a certain extent seem to limit public participation in
the process and result in less “NIMBY” issues.
Summary of Findings
In this chapter I have presented the results of my methods, identifying which independent
variables were statistically significant with the decision to build or not build a temporary housing
site in Orleans Parish in the four months following Hurricane Katrina. These preliminary
findings provide some insight into how the environmental factors and some demographic factors
in Orleans Parish influenced the process of siting temporary housing. In the sixth and final
chapter, I will offer conclusions and policy recommendations based on these findings.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Only four of the independent variables evaluated resulted in being statistically significant
with association to sites being built. Of the four, historic status and being approved by
environmental had positive correlations. Residential sites and Pre-Katrina hazardous material
issues had inverse correlations. The inverse association with residential properties is particularly
interesting due to the fact that it is housing that is being built, but most of the sites were built on
commercial sites. However, this could be due to most of the sites that were considered being
commercial properties (23 commercial out of 50 sites). Nevertheless, this study has provided
preliminary findings regarding how certain environmental factors of Orleans Parish played a role
in the siting process.
Temporary Housing
As previously stated, the Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to implement temporary housing
and when needed, the federal government can build trailer parks. The results of this analysis
outline the process and indicate the problems associated with the federal government locating
feasible temporary housing sites in the major metropolitan area of New Orleans. As we have
seen, the laws that are in place are to protect the environment and residents’ health, not put
tenants in hazard areas, and not to promote development of sensitive/hazard areas, directly or
indirectly. Furthermore, this study has shown that the environmental issues, such as floodplains,
wetlands, and threatened or endangered species habitat did not play a large role in the approval
or disapproval of temporary housing sites. This finding is based on the data in this study, which
is from the first four months of the response. It would be expected that these would be the most
accessible, most feasible sites. It does not mean that these factors or other factors not did play a
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larger role in the sites considered after January 15, 2006, which is where this study’s data set
stops. A larger role of these factors would be expected due to the environmental history of New
Orleans.
Most of Orleans Parish is in the floodplain, except for portions of the natural levees and
ridges, where the city was first settled and other areas considered to be protected by levee.
Additionally, the trailer parks placed in the floodplain or areas protected by levees, are
essentially placing people in hazard areas and not directly supporting development of the
floodplain, but certainly supporting redevelopment. This seems to be where the intent of the laws
conflict with one another. NFIP and 44 CFR Part 9 discourage occupancy of the floodplain.
FEMA’s purpose is to respond to the emergency and restore normalcy. If normalcy, as in New
Orleans, is in the floodplain, should FEMA place people and resources there? This would seem
to just encourage rebuilding and increase the chances for the next disaster to be more
catastrophic. However, incremental changes to disasters seem to be the norm over history and
exacerbate the next catastrophe (Colten et al, 2006).
As stated, FEMA puts travel trailers in floodplains and mobile homes in areas out of the
floodplain. These types of housing are not very dense in nature and would not work in very
urban areas, especially if the intent is to not increase the city’s footprint. The city’s footprint
would increase if this type of operation were done in a highly urbanized area. This is emergency
housing and the intent is to house as many people as possible, as quickly as possible. This would
not likely be consistent with a city’s smart growth plan, but a disaster probably is not either.
However, other options are available to use as housing that could be denser in nature,
having a smaller environmental footprint. Some of these are stackable modular units, and the
denCity, designed by a group of architects from StudioRED. This idea creates a steel
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superstructure that individual pods or “dens” can be inserted into, resembling a stack of shelves.
This type of structure can be used in tightly packed urban areas and allows people to live closer
to where they resided before a disaster, as compared with a distant trailer park (Tucker, 2006).
However, there could be issues with placing something like the denCity in the floodplain. The
modular units FEMA has used, called COGIMS, are elevated above base flood elevation (BFE).
However, this could also be done with the denCity, or the lower floors could be left vacant.
There’s also the option of just not locating the structures in the floodplain. FEMA is now
contemplating building a new type of housing for New Orleans and south Louisiana. The
“Katrina Cottages” are permanent housing currently being discussed to provide an alternative to
long-term use of temporary housing (Shields, 2006).
Emergency Response Policy Recommendations
Humans have been adapting to and changing with disasters since civilizations were
established (Diamond, 1997). The events of Hurricane Katrina should be no different. I think it
would be beneficial for the National Response Plan to require states and cities to have
emergency housing provisions in their emergency response plans. Specifically, communities
should have a redundant system of potential temporary housing locations identified prior to a
disaster. These pre-identified sites would take the survey work out of the response. Additionally,
having the sites preplanned could allow communities to find the most suitable, least
environmentally sensitive areas to use, minimizing the impact on the environment. This pre-
identification of sites was not done in Orleans Parish, but a fair number of parks/greenspace
areas in the city were used as temporary housing sites. This could be a sufficient plan, if the
parks are not also being used as water retention areas or other uses also. Using parks could cause
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a loss of greenspace to a city, but if the areas used were parks before, it could be mandated that
they be returned to their pre-housing use upon the completion of the temporary housing term.
Many of the sites constructed in my study were in commercial parking lots. Commercial
parking lots could also be potential temporary housing sites. These are feasible for engineering
purposes and less environmentally invasive when compared to other land uses that at minimum
would require the removal of vegetation. Plans for use of commercial lots would have to have
agreements previously signed to expedite the process. Potential problems that may arise with the
use of commercial sites could be the presence of potential hazardous materials. This issue would
have to be remedied on a case by case basis.
Future Research
A great deal of time and money has been invested in the temporary housing mission in
Louisiana since the hurricanes of 2005. To make the disaster response of temporary housing
more efficient, further research needs to be conducted. The study I conducted only used the
temporary housing site data from the day the disaster was declared to January 15, 2006 in
Orleans Parish. Future studies should use data from other parishes. Also, an analysis of all the
sites considered in Orleans Parish should be conducted. The sites in the data used in this study
were more than likely the “low hanging fruit,” the most suitable sites in the area. By doing a
study of the proposed and built sites from the dates after January 15, 2006, one could achieve
other results as less desirable sites were probably submitted for use.
In addition, studies relating to this research could be conducted on a 9 digit zip code
instead of a 5 digit zip code, which was used in this research. This research used only 3
demographic variables. Future studies could also use more demographic variables to identify
possible associations with them and site construction or approval.
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Additionally, over the long-term it is worth noting that FEMA is placing temporary
housing in the floodplain of Orleans Parish, which is considered a hazard area. It will be
interesting to observe over time if the repopulation of New Orleans is successful, how the
temporary housing parks may influence redevelopment patterns, and if any of the parks flood or
are damaged by a natural disaster, since they were placed there in the relief of flooding due to
Hurricane Katrina.
Summary
This research has attempted to provide insight into the process of implementing
temporary housing and a preliminary analysis into the environmental factors that influenced the
siting of FEMA’s temporary housing sites after Hurricane Katrina in Orleans Parish. Being that
FEMA is the primary agency that responds to and provides temporary housing for all disasters in
the U.S., this research is important in ensuring that hasty decisions made in an emergency
situation do not adversely impact people or the environment. This research will become
increasingly important as more people are moving to coastal communities, while sea-levels rise
and more intense hurricanes are expected due to global climate change.
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APPENDIX A: LEVEE FAILURES IN NEW ORLEANS
Note: Maximum water levels at specific points may vary greatly as topography can
change drastically, for example from any given street to any given house foundation.
Sources: C&C Technologies Survey Services, www.mapper.cctechnol.com/floodmap.php,
LSU Hurricane Center
Source: New Orleans Times-Picayune
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APPENDIX B: T.S. HARDEE 1878 MAP OF NEW ORLEANS
T.S. Hardee Map of New Orleans 1878
The spotted areas not developed in the city and along the lake are cypress swamps
Source: Historic New Orleans Collection 00.34AB
Printer:L. Graham 1878
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APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF STATISTICAL METHODS
Means of Continuous Variables
Case Processing Summary
48 94.1% 3 5.9% 51 100.0%
48 94.1% 3 5.9% 51 100.0%
50 98.0% 1 2.0% 51 100.0%
50 98.0% 1 2.0% 51 100.0%
50 98.0% 1 2.0% 51 100.0%
AMOUNT * SITEBILT
ACREAGE * SITEBILT
in thousands * SITEBILT
in thousands * SITEBILT
& black * SITEBILT
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Included Excluded Total
Cases
Report
127.4000 6.2727 27.9375 88.8750 70.3188
30 30 32 32 32
191.28253 8.81901 8.79493 25.67005 17.83491
45.2222 2.3944 23.8889 97.6667 66.7833
18 18 18 18 18
27.66513 2.02033 7.47458 37.52176 16.41736
96.5833 4.8183 26.4800 92.0400 69.0460
48 48 50 50 50
156.42724 7.28459 8.49547 30.38928 17.25357
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
SITEBILT
.00
1.00
Total
AMOUNT ACREAGE in thousands in thousands & black
Note: Column 4 (in thousands) denotes income. Column 5 (in thousands) denotes property value
ANOVA
75973.356 1 75973.356 3.254 .078
1074092 46 23349.833
1150066 47
169.207 1 169.207 3.348 .074
2324.863 46 50.540
2494.069 47
188.827 1 188.827 2.707 .106
3347.653 48 69.743
3536.480 49
890.420 1 890.420 .963 .331
44361.500 48 924.198
45251.920 49
143.990 1 143.990 .479 .492
14442.614 48 300.888
14586.604 49
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
AMOUNT
ACREAGE
in thousands
in thousands
& black
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Phi Coefficient of Correlation Analysis Results
Crosstabs
Warnings
No measures of association are computed for the crosstabulation of FARMLAND *
SITEBILT. At least one variable in each 2-way table upon which measures of
association are computed is a constant.
Case Processing Summary
48 94.1% 3 5.9% 51 100.0%
48 94.1% 3 5.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
50 98.0% 1 2.0% 51 100.0%
50 98.0% 1 2.0% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
49 96.1% 2 3.9% 51 100.0%
FARMLAND * SITEBILT
UNDISTRB * SITEBILT
RESIDEN * SITEBILT
COMMERCI * SITEBILT
PARK * SITEBILT
FLOODPLN * SITEBILT
WETLAND * SITEBILT
HABITAT * SITEBILT
HAZMAT * SITEBILT
PREKHZMT * SITEBILT
POSTKHZM * SITEBILT
HISTORIC * SITEBILT
PASSENV * SITEBILT
PCE * SITEBILT
EA * SITEBILT
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Valid Missing Total
Cases
FARMLAND * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
30 18 48
30 18 48
.00FARMLAND
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.
a
48
PhiNominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value
No statistics are computed because
FARMLAND is a constant.
a.
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UNDISTRB * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
30 17 47
0 1 1
30 18 48
.00
1.00
UNDISTRB
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.188 .192
.188 .192
.185 .192
48
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
RESIDEN * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
22 18 40
9 0 9
31 18 49
.00
1.00
RESIDEN
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
-.361 .011
.361 .011
.340 .011
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
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COMMERCI * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
19 7 26
12 11 23
31 18 49
.00
1.00
COMMERCI
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.216 .130
.216 .130
.211 .130
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
PARK * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
21 12 33
10 6 16
31 18 49
.00
1.00
PARK
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.011 .938
.011 .938
.011 .938
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
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FLOODPLN * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
12 5 17
20 13 33
32 18 50
.00
1.00
FLOODPLN
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.099 .486
.099 .486
.098 .486
50
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
WETLAND * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
28 17 45
4 1 5
32 18 50
.00
1.00
WETLAND
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
-.111 .432
.111 .432
.110 .432
50
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
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HABITAT * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
32 17 49
32 17 49
.00HABITAT
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.
a
49
PhiNominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value
No statistics are computed because HABITAT
is a constant.
a.
HAZMAT * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
25 17 42
6 1 7
31 18 49
.00
1.00
HAZMAT
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
-.190 .183
.190 .183
.187 .183
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
58
PREKHZMT * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
25 18 43
6 0 6
31 18 49
.00
1.00
PREKHZMT
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
-.285 .046
.285 .046
.274 .046
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
POSTKHZM * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
31 17 48
0 1 1
31 18 49
.00
1.00
POSTKHZM
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.189 .185
.189 .185
.186 .185
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
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HISTORIC * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
25 8 33
6 10 16
31 18 49
.00
1.00
HISTORIC
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.372 .009
.372 .009
.349 .009
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
PASSENV * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
8 0 8
23 18 41
31 18 49
.00
1.00
PASSENV
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.337 .018
.337 .018
.319 .018
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
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PCE * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
4 0 4
27 18 45
31 18 49
.00
1.00
PCE
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
.227 .112
.227 .112
.222 .112
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
EA * SITEBILT
Crosstab
Count
27 18 45
4 0 4
31 18 49
.00
1.00
EA
Total
.00 1.00
SITEBILT
Total
Symmetric Measures
-.227 .112
.227 .112
.222 .112
49
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
Not assuming the null hypothesis.a.
Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null
hypothesis.
b.
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